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Abstract This paper looks beyond more traditional evaluation activities to focus
primarily on evaluation up front. It suggests that the early appraisal of an investment
case or a project should apply essentially the same evaluation criteria that will be used
in ex post evaluation, and thus increase the likelihood of a successful project outcome.
However, the initial plan might be altered as result of subsequent analysis, assessment,
negotiation, positioning, and the exercise of power. The last part of this paper presents
an empirical study of 23 projects, which examines the complexity of processes that
occur in the idea- and decision phases.
Keywords Ex ante evaluation . Decisionmaking . Public investment projects
On Evaluation in General
An investment case, a process or a project is typically divided into three distinct
phases. In the beginning, an idea and decision phase lasts until the final decision to
implement is made. The implementation phase follows, continuing until the project’s
outputs are realized. The goal could be to build a building, to reorganize an organi-
zation, or to have a student pass a final exam. Finally, there is an operational phase, in
which the benefits of the project are realized or revenue comes in. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Experience indicates that today, most evaluation activities occur in the implementa-
tion phase or just after its conclusion, options designated interim evaluation and final
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evaluation, respectively. This is puzzling because the implementation phase is the
period in which the project is least likely to benefit from an evaluation (Samset
2003). An interim evaluation can help avoid or correct mistakes during a project, that
is, it provides management information. A final evaluation assesses the results at the
conclusion of the implementation phase, that is, it provides control information.
It is a paradox that systematic ex ante and ex post evaluations are rarely used.
Ex ante evaluation provides strategic information about the main choices at an
early stage, when the possibility to influence the course of an undertaking is
greatest. Such an approach attempts to find the best approach or conceptual
solution of possible alternatives, which is essential. Ex post evaluation undertak-
en well into the operational phase will provide learning information to improve
design and decisions for similar projects in the future, which is also valuable
(Andersen et al. 2008).
Ex ante evaluation is a broad initial assessment aimed at identifying which alterna-
tive will yield the greatest benefit from an intended investment. More commonly,
considerable resources are used on detailed planning of a single, specific solution,
whereas alternatives are not (or are inadequately) assessed early on. Consequently,
there is no adequate basis for concluding that the preferred alternative is the best choice.
The goal of ex post evaluation is first and most importantly to assess the lessons
learned in an undertaking. The motivation for using ex post evaluation is principally
that it contributes to double loop learning. Consequently, the evaluation of a single
project is seldom sufficient; it is necessary to evaluate several similar projects.
However, this is not common, and the use of evaluation for learning purposes is not
encouraging (Schindler and Eppler 2003).
Business, particularly industries, are better at both ex ante and ex post evaluation,
with their ex ante market forecasts and ex post user surveys. However, these are
relatively limited assessments in which profitability is the paramount objective and
demand and user satisfaction are key evaluation criteria. In such cases, a narrow
economic incentive clearly motivates the conduct of such studies.
Incentives in public investment projects are not as clear. The goal often is more
compound and complex than the industry’s goal of profitability. Attention is focussed
on socio-economic benefit, but individuals are not made accountable to the same extent
in relation to the achievement of objectives, as is the case in business. Consequently,
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Fig. 1 Evaluation of an undertaking at different points in time
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there is no clear tradition for such evaluations. One notable exception is the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance who introduced a scheme in 2000 for ex ante evaluation of the
country’s largest public investment projects, the so-called quality assurance scheme
(Samset et al. 2006). Fifteen years later, 260 projects have been exposed to this QA
scheme. In coming years, a large number of ex post evaluations will be made of the
same projects. The study presented in the latter part of this paper is based on material
from this scheme.
Ex Ante Evaluation
This suggests that evaluation should be conducted early on because the possibility of
influencing a process is greatest at the outset and diminishes thereafter. However,
how—and when? At the conclusion of the project or while it is underway?
Obviously, the goal is to establish the quality of what has been produced, whether it
is in for example school education, the implementation of a reform, or the construction
of a house. During implementation? Yes, provided there is a distinct need for it, such as
for example before the project enters a new phase, when there is a change of
management, when there are indications that the project is moving in the wrong
direction, or on suspicion of illegal conduct.
We suggest an evaluation at the very beginning, before the project is initiated. The
justification for ex ante evaluation is a desire to clarify the major questions that will
determine the terms of planning. The benefits to be accrued were demonstrated by a
World Bank evaluation of more than 1000 investment cases. The evaluation showed
that as many as 80 % of the cases that conducted a thorough feasibility study and
secured BQuality at Entry^ were successful, whereas only 35 % of those with poor
preparation were successful (The World Bank 1997).
The benefit of ex ante evaluation is principally related to whether one is able
to identify the best solution to the problem at hand and avoid expensive and
ineffective solutions. This will be based on estimates of the project’s effects.
Such estimates are useful for management decisions during implementation and
are benchmark information for interim and ex post evaluations. Ex ante eval-
uation may also be useful for studying different scenarios and the effects of
changes in certain parameters during the course of implementation. Systematic
sensitivity analysis is all too little used, even in major, extensive projects
(Jovanovic 1999).
Each investment case or project represents only one of several possible con-
cepts that may be realized. In advance, other concepts may have been assessed but
rejected in favour of the one preferred. After the project is completed, it is
evaluated in relation to planned and projected goals and effects and to the ex ante
situation—but rarely in relation to the counterfactual, i.e., what the situation
would have been had the project not been realized (Harberger 1997). The reason
for this is first and most importantly that people’s preference is commonly to
invest in something new. However, seen in retrospect, the zero option has many
times proved to be the most profitable choice, suggesting that an ex ante evalu-
ation should also review the zero option because it affords a basis of comparison
for assessing future benefit.
Ex ante evaluation and the complexity of early decision-making
Evaluation Based on Insufficient Information
In an ex ante evaluation, much must be based on assumptions because fewer facts are
available. It is more bounded concerning history, facts and interpretations, leading to a
selection of decision premises influenced by organization structures and actors’ roles,
as noted by Simon (1957). Lack of information leads to greater reliance on experience,
on opinion or at worst on guesswork. This is a disadvantage but not a hindrance. The
combination of facts and well-founded assumptions are the best you can provide in an
early phase. However, an ex ante evaluation can contribute systematic generation and
analysis of such information. The assumption is that this process will provide better
results than without systematic analysis, although the information base is weak. There
is a large literature in this area, for example, Goodwin and Wright (1991); Bazerman
(1994), and Williams, and Sunnevaag (2009).
As mentioned, ex ante evaluation occurs when principal decisions are made and the
possibility of making changes is greatest—but when uncertainty is greatest and the
information basis is the most limited. What matters then is which type of information is
needed. Because the major focus is on the problem and the needs that the project is
meant to meet, there is a lesser need for detailed knowledge of the alternative solutions
to the problem.
This illustrates a dilemma because most projects start out with only one specific
conceptual solution to a problem. Much of the information generated is associated with
that particular solution. Indeed, in many cases, the amount of specific, detailed infor-
mation contributes to freezing the original choice of concept to the extent that it will be
the eventually realized option. In all too few cases, other possible concepts are
identified and analysed sufficiently.
Concerning the information needs in ex ante evaluation, information production
often outstrips needs—one asks for more although the needed information is already
there (Feldman and March 1981). Experience suggests that in the earliest parts of the
process, our concern should be to understand the problem in its context and the needs
and interests of the affected parties, to design a sound, strategic solution and assess
possibilities and risks. Therefore, at the outset, the need is first and most importantly to
establish perspective. Intuition, creativity and imagination can then be more valuable
than exact, factual information. One could therefore turn the problem around and argue
that the lack of information early on can actually, rather than a hindrance, be a benefit
by providing focus and flexibility to the analysis.
Moreover, the validity of information may be a problem. It is obvious, as experience
confirms, that the more precise information is, the more rapidly it becomes obsolete. It
is tempting to speak of information half-life. For example, in a rapidly expanding
market, the value of information on demand as a basis for planning may depreciate
within a few days. At the same time, the validity of qualitative measures often is more
durable than precise quantitative information. Consider, for example, the basic percep-
tions of the needs of user groups. We may know little about the urgency of the need but
can be certain that it will persist for a long time. Therefore, it may be included in initial
assessments.
Omitting details and less-relevant information helps avoid analysis paralysis. This is
yet another argument for avoiding drowning the initial process with detailed, quantita-
tive information. The lack of quantitative information ex ante leads to no great lasting
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problem. The need for precise and detailed information increases with the advance of the
process. Later, such information will be more readily available (Williams et al. 2009).
Commonplace opinion holds that the quality of a decision base is decisive for
decisions. However, opinion varies on the meaning of ‘the quality of a decision base’.
Experience suggests that decision makers often are less affected by decision bases than
what one would think is desirable. Studies have shown that even when good decision
bases are available, decisions are largely more influenced by the decision-maker’s
intuition and personal or political preferences than by facts and analyses (Feldman
and March 1981; Henden 2004; Mintzberg 2000). The practical implications of this are
not necessarily disastrous. Several studies have shown that in many situations, intuition
is preferable to rational analysis, particularly when the decision situation is complex, as
is often the case in large investment projects. The assumption then is that intuition is
based on experience and training. If the decision maker has the needed relevant
professional experience in the sectors involved, intuition can help make sound deci-
sions more rapidly. However, we cannot expect effective intuition without thorough
knowledge of the theme at hand. In turn, that characteristic involves many years of
experience combined with workable analyses.
Early on, it is essential to establish the best possible understanding of reality as a
basis for identifying a suitable strategy. Subsequent critical steps include identifying the
overall framework conditions that should guide subsequent decisions on the choice of
concept and then the necessary framework conditions that should guide the planning
and shaping of the project. That framework and conditions are the specific solution of
the problem at hand—in other words, what the project is to deliver. In such a stepwise
process, it is advantageous to choose an approach with corresponding increases in
degree of detail and level of precision of information. The challenge is to acquire the
essentials and limit the magnitude of what is communicated. This improves commu-
nication and increases the likelihood of the evaluation results being used. The Pareto
Principle, also known as the 80–20 rule, may be used to illustrate information needs.
The notion is that in a cause-effect relationship, a vital few causes lead to the greater
part of the consequences. To clarify these causes is the central challenge.
Some Evaluation Criteria
An evaluation involves an assessment employing specific evaluation criteria and
measures against standards or expected values such as knowledge and proficiency
relative to learning goals or effects relative to strategic plans. A much-used evaluation
model is based on five evaluation criteria that together express the degree of success,
OECD (2002).
Evaluation according to this evaluation model highlights (1) the need for the project
(relevance), (2) whether the uses of resources and time are reasonable (efficiency), (3)
whether expectations are fulfilled (effectiveness), (4) what other positive or negative
effects may occur because of the project (impacts), and (5) whether the positive effects
persist after the conclusion of the project (sustainability).
Evaluation typically involves a process in which overriding evaluation criteria are
disaggregated into more-detailed evaluation questions that are relevant to the conditions
to be evaluated. Then, information is acquired that answers the questions. Finally, the
Ex ante evaluation and the complexity of early decision-making
information is aggregated to support conclusions relative to the overriding evaluation
criteria (Fig. 2).
This is an example of goal-oriented evaluation, which is one of many possible
approaches to evaluation. The model is principally intended for application in the ex
post situation, but it conceivably could be even more beneficial ex ante, in the front-end
phase. The question that arises is to what extent have we sufficient information at an
early stage to be able to apply these evaluation criteria in an ex ante evaluation of a
project.
Considering efficiency, it is likely that we might have an accurate perception about the
project’s cost and ultimate outputs, but there is little chance of assessingwhether there is a
reasonable correlation between them. Likewise, it is not known whether the conditions in
the implementation phase will permit achievement of the desired result. Not least, the
difficulties of planners and decision makers in estimating realistic costs provide a clear
message that we often have a poor basis for assessing effectiveness at an early stage.
The situation is much the same for efficiency or goal achievement. We are expected
to have a clear idea about the first-order effects that we want to achieve with the project,
but in this area, we are also notoriously bad at producing realistic estimates and
estimating the effect of external factors that could affect the process and thus the
achievement of objectives.
It is even more difficult to estimate impacts early on. Studying similar projects
doubtless provides knowledge based on experience. However, we then are likely to
face conditions that are difficult to predict and may require imagination and ability to
guess beyond our capabilities.
The situation for relevance differs. Early on, common sense combined with for example
studies of priorities and needs in society, market demands, legislation and regulations, can
provide a solid picture at an early stage of whether the measure is relevant. However, this
will require openness and a thorough analysis at the beginning. Additionally, needs and
priorities clearly may change in the future and may be difficult to predict.
Finally, future sustainability is somewhat more difficult to assess. However, the
question is closely associated with the relevance of a project. Moreover, people tend to
do reasonably well in realistically assessing future needs and resources, not least in the
form of cash flow analyses.
The conclusion then is that with reasonable effort, we can obtain a good picture at an
early stage of whether a proposed project is relevant and sustainable, but to a greater
Detail 
level
Aggregate
level
Recommendations
Evaluation instruments
Evaluation questions Results
ConclusionsEvaluation criteria
Data
Measures
Action
Fig. 2 Evaluation is part of an information process based on overriding questions and, through analyses and
decision making, results in actions at the detail level
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degree, we must disregard the other three criteria. The good news is that relevance and
sustainability are precisely the two aspects that are most crucial to whether a project
will succeed. Consequently, such a delimitation of an ex ante evaluation will, therefore,
be the minimalist answer to what might be an appropriate approach, not least because
the benefit relative to resource allocation will be quite high.
Decisions in the Front-end Phases of Major Public Investment Projects
The discussion above concerns improving the basis for planning and decision making
early on based on ex ante evaluation. The picture is simplified by being limited to goal
management techniques developed in the implementation of projects. However, an ex
ante evaluation that is conducted at a sufficiently early point in time and with the
necessary openness is, as mentioned above, no guarantee that the best alternative is
chosen. Decision processes take time, in many cases months or years. Often, several
parties with divergent assessments and preferences are involved, new problems and
solutions arise and conditions change. Therefore, they are often complex and the
answer unpredictable. The patterns evident in such processes are called decision logic,
a phenomenon that has been researched for many years.
The inherent complexity is illustrated in Table 1, which compares the early phase
evaluations of a selection of 23 major public investment projects (Whist and
Christensen 2011). Such an analysis provides deep insight into the conditions for ex
ante evaluation and, not least, affords reflection on the public quality assurance scheme,
particularly the part applicable to the quality assurance of the choice of concept (QA1)
but also the part that pertains to the quality assurance of the management system
(QA2), which clearly has ex ante features. At the same time, such a unified decision
analysis provides clear terms for ex post evaluation and what may be learned about the
organization of the processes in major public investment projects.
Of the 23 projects in Table 1, 11 are transport projects, of which two are large road
works, two are railway works, three are bridges and underwater tunnels to replace ferry
links, two are other tunnel projects and two are building projects. There five defence
projects and a variety of other projects, including a cultural centre, a research centre,
two hospitals and two sports facilities.
The analysis is broad and brings in several elements of events in the front-end phase.
The presentation and discussion is principally of the experience addressing decision
analysis. The focus is on the characteristics of the front-end phases of the projects as
decision processes and how they may be understood, interpreted and explained. The
evaluation technique is emphatically analytical, in the sense that the front-end phase is
interpreted through the following four organizational theory perspectives or decision logics.
1) Instrumental logic. This logic demonstrates that a particular actor has had relatively
clear goals and an understanding of the problems/needs and the solutions/concept
(Dahl and Lindblom 1953; March and Olsen 1983). The actor may be a high-
ranking leader in the public or private sectors.
2) Institutional logic. This logic emphasizes the importance of historical traditions,
path dependence and informal decision norms that may modify or tie up instru-
mental logic (Selznick 1957).
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3) Environmental logic. This logic emphasizes that temporary or long-term occur-
rences in environments press upon and influence public decision processes, both of
a technical and institutional nature (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
4) Contingency logic, often also called garbage can theory (March and Olsen 1976).
This logic considers temporal effects on the decision process of actors who come
and go relative to decisions, and the effects of chance combinations of problems/
needs and solutions/concepts.
Instrumental Logic
Instrumental logic incorporates two main aspects of concern in the front-end phases of
major public investment projects: political or administrative control and rational calcu-
lation. Instrumental logic is understood as a good view into and an understanding of the
goal, problem, solutions/alternatives and effects (Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Simon
1957). Accordingly, the ideal for a decision process will be that governmental leaders
act based on clearly defined problems and goals, clear views of the possible means and
solutions and, not least, the potential consequences of choosing one or another alter-
native. Ex ante evaluation should be able to induce clear thinking and management in
accordance with these ideals. Political and administrative control may be understood as
two forms of decision logic: 1) leaders have clear hierarchal control over the front-end
phase or 2) leaders and public institutions in part have dissimilar interests and initiate
negotiations to hammer out compromises (March and Olsen 1983).
To what degree does the front-end phase reflect the degree of leadership
agreement and firm hierarchical control of the processes? The answer is that it
varies considerably between and within various types of project. The selected
regional and local road, tunnel and bridge projects most strongly reflect the
involvement and control of political leaders, most often in interaction and
agreement with regional and local competent authorities, that is, The Public
Roads Administration. The opposite is true of large defence projects that are
characterized by insufficient authority and breakthrough for central executive
political and administrative leaders and considerable disagreement with military
sector authorities. In other projects that are concerned with for example culture,
sports, research, and hospitals, there are clear variations in the degree to which
central political leaders break through. The extent ranges from considerable in
the New Opera House, the New National Museum of art and the Tromsø
Olympic Winter Games projects, to clearly less for the Regional University
Hospital and the Svalbard Arctic Research Park projects. Overall, it is surpris-
ing that the Government was not more-centrally involved in many of the
projects. However, expert authorities are systematically central, which indirectly
suggests a considerable potential influence, because of the shared norms among
political and expert leadership.
What of tugs of war and negotiations, primarily within the political-administrative
apparatus, occur during the front-end phases of projects? These essential aspects
underscore the limits of hierarchical control. In the group of road projects, negoti-
ations between political and administrative regional and local actors are vital. Thus,
there are many tugs of war to balance the interests of the involved parties and
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municipalities, which lead to choices between alternatives and alignment adjustments
during a project. These negotiation processes are also important because agreement
must prevail to contribute funding and because concurring views are vital towards
the State to obtain support in the form of subsidies and toll systems. A clear
example of a successful negotiation process is that concerning the Bjørvika im-
mersed motorway tunnel (E18) through Oslo, whereas the process for the Northern
beltway (E6) in Trondheim was more disorderly and discordant. In military projects,
there is more internal disagreement than actual internal negotiation processes,
whereas other projects such as the New Opera House, the Regional and the
National university hospitals exhibit a clear internal negotiation process.
The question of rational calculation is tantamount to asking whether the front-end
phases of the projects are characterized by clear, well thought-through analyses. The
main answer must be no. In approximately half of the projects, the planning and
preparations lack many of the features outlined above. The least-pondered projects
are the Stad shipping tunnel and the Tromsø OlymicWinter Game projects, whereas the
E18 Bjørvika highway, the Finnfast sub-fjord road tunnel, the National customs and
traffic border-control facility at Svinesund, the new National University Hospital and
the acquisition of new fighter aircraft score relatively high in rational calculation. Only
one-fourth of the projects approach the ideal. For these projects, considerable potential
exists for an ex ante evaluation that would contribute to greater clarity in the reasoning
about the projects.
There are many difficulties in the reasoning about the projects. In some projects,
clear goals and problem analyses are completely or partly lacking, as for the Stad
shipping tunnel, the control tower at Værnes airport, the Tromsø Olympic Winter
Games, the New Opera House, the Arctic Research Park, the Regional University
Hospital, the new Holmenkollen winter sports arena, and the new class of coastal
corvette and frigate projects. In many of these projects, both problems and solutions
were expanded during the project. True, the projects vary considerably in size and
complexity, but that seems not to be decisive for how they score on rational
calculation.
The instrumental logic aims to explain most of what happens in the front-end phases
of projects, particularly in the form of hierarchical management or negotiations but also
in rational calculation. This logic most often dominates reasoning on the conduct of
rational processes, either in what may be called bounded rationality or in the more
concise economic version of it. Our version of rationality focuses more on the
importance of organization/control and on organizational reasoning, which may lead
to learning that improves the organization of decision processes and perhaps improves
the rational calculation.
Institutional Logic
Institutional logic started in what is called Bold institutional^ reasoning in organization
theory (Selznick 1957). Its core lies in public organizations having gradually developed
sets of informal norms and values through mutual adaption to internal and external
pressures. Through this institutionalization process, a unique culture or identity evolves
in an organization.
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Reasoning concerning path dependence is central in institutional logic. The cultural
hallmark of an organization at its Bbirth^ continues to influence its further development
strongly, a phenomenon called Broots determine routes^ in the literature. Another
position holds that when an institutionalized organization encounters pressure for
change or reform, it will react according to the degree to which the impetus for change
agrees with its cultural traditions (March 1994). Changes or reforms are more easily
accepted when there is considerable agreement. However, when there is no cultural
agreement, the penchant is to avoid change/reform or pragmatically use only some of
its elements. With this logic, ex ante evaluation can either point to the necessity of
cultural sensitivity in projects or consciously depart from the established cultural track
and eventually be innovative.
Military projects exhibit this sort of logic to a great degree. In building the
Skjold-class coastal corvettes, the frigates and the Malangen torpedo battery, the
point of departure for the competent authorities should have considerable institu-
tional continuity to commit to the same type of military platform. This has contrib-
uted to considerable investment in military vessels that are militarily unnecessary or
cost too much to operate. This is a negative aspect of tradition and cultural
continuity. However, in many other projects, cultural factors conceivably may
contribute to strengthening a project.
Culture theory also includes elements of shocks and unbalanced development
(Kingdon 1984), implying that public organizations may long follow the same cultural
path. However, then comes a dramatic period of change that ends with choosing a new
path that thereafter is characterized by continuity (Aberbach and Christensen 2011;
Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Such a change of path may be brought about by internal
changes, such as a change of Government or political majority, but also may be due to
sudden external changes or shock. In the 23 projects analysed, there are several such
breaks. An example is the New Opera House; when the former Oslo West railway
station was closed, it became a potential location, as happened with the Bjørvika option
when the opera was seen in a broader urban development perspective. There was also a
critical break after many stages of expanding the National University Hospital in
downtown Oslo, in which the new location in the outskirts beyond the main beltway
was a radical solution. The opposite is true of the location of the new Regional
University Hospital being tied to the city of Trondheim. The same is true of the
Tromsø Olympic Winter Games, in which one round of application ties up the next,
or the new Holmenkollen winter sports arena, which is tied to the institutional identity
of the old location.
The lesson learned in the use of such logic and the other logics is that there never are
only advantages or only disadvantages associated with assessing projects from such
vantage points. Institutional and cultural continuity may have clear advantages in many
projects because they include a form of institutional intelligence; over time, the
institutions have become skilled at adapting, which may inform the ex ante evaluation
(Boin and Christensen 2008; Kaufman 1976). Activities and efficiency may be im-
proved by following or slightly modifying the historical path. However, the path also
may impose a form of trained incapacity or inertia whenever a public organization is
too rigid or old fashioned in meeting new challenges, or when it is better at some point
to forsake the old path and start anew. In several military projects, this did not happen.
The results were cost overruns and failures.
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Environmental Logic
Environmental logic focuses on how decision-making processes, in this case those in
major public investment projects, are influenced by their ambient environments
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). This can happen whenever occurrences and actors in
the environment intervene in processes and exert pressure to bring about particular
solutions. This can occur through dependencies, coalitions or negotiations with
actors in the environment, or through normative social influence towards images
and hallmarks, which is seen in connection with pressure to bring in modern reforms
and management principles (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). With such logic, an ex
ante evaluation can either contribute realism related to external conditions, such as
resources and time, or may contribute to building images of the worth of particular
project solutions.
The clearest examples of the importance of environments are evident in military
projects such as the Skjold-class coastal corvettes, the frigate project and the new
fighter aircraft. The large coalitions that were established were decisive in the outcome.
Sectoral military leadership allied itself with the principal defence politicians of the
Conservative and Labour parties and the Confederation of Trade Unions, often against
executive political leaders and the Chief of Defence. The motives of the coalition
focussed on employment for external actors, which defocussed the suitability of
projects in terms of other considerations. Throughout, this contributed to costly bad
investments, at least for two of these projects. Another type of environmental mecha-
nism was at play in the new Holmenkollen winter sport arena, namely pressure from
national and international ski federations, which greatly inflated costs. In the 23
projects investigated, there have been relatively few negative effects from external
influences, but again this observation cannot be generalized to infer that such pressure
is undesirable. Alliances with private actors can be necessary and useful. This is most
evident in the E18 Bjørvika immersed highway and the New Opera House with the
surrounding urban development. The State placed considerable pressure on the
Municipality of Oslo and on various public and private developers, who together in a
coalition are committed to urban development around the Opera, with apartments and
commercial buildings. This form of win-win situation is one in which all concerned
parties gain and commit themselves.
Contingency Logic
Contingency or garbage can logic entails a profuse mix of problems, solutions,
participants and decision possibilities that come and go, in which actors face capacity
and attentional problems and decisions appear to be incidental (March and Olsen 1976).
A characteristic of contingency logic is that problems and solutions are associated and
dissociated, or decoupled and recoupled, and have effects on decisions. Another aspect
is that the structures of problems and solutions are particularly complex and unclear. A
third aspect is that solutions come before the problem. A fourth is that there is a sort of
local rationality in which the focus is solely on one’s own project, without placing it in
a greater context. In an ex ante evaluation, all such features can lead to deviation from
strong management and clear thinking.
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The foremost example of coupling and decoupling is found in the two fjordside
projects at Bjørvika in Oslo, the New Opera House and the nearby E18 immersed
motorway. However, the sequence came about deliberately, not by chance. When the
Opera was proposed for approval, it was important to dissociate it from the road
project, which was so expensive that it might not have gained financing. The Opera
was publicised as a unique, isolated project, although almost everyone realized that the
development of the surrounding area presupposed a road solution such as the immersed
tube tunnel that finally was chosen, and, not least, further urban development (Whist
and Christensen 2012). Once the new Opera project was approved, the road project was
again proposed on the strength of arguments including seeing the new Opera as part of
a greater urban development.
Four of the transport projects—the two railway projects around Oslo, the Hardanger
Fjord suspension bridge and the Ryfast road project—also have elements of dissocia-
tion and association to increase the chances of realization. The National Museum at
Tullinløkka in the centre of the city is an example. When the Cabinet minister for
culture intervened and opened up the possibility of relocation to the old Oslo West
railway station, many actors were astounded because they had expected an architectural
competition for development at Tullinløkka. These examples are characterized by
organized anarchy in which some actors consciously exploit association and dissocia-
tion rather than letting chance rule.
There are also several examples of other characteristics of such logic. The
structures of problems and their solutions are complex and unclear for E6 Norther
beltway, the Jondal road tunnel and the Stad shipping tunnel. Perhaps the Stad
shipping tunnel is the foremost example of a solution arising before a problem, but
that is also the case for the Arctic Research Park on Svalbard. The foremost
examples of local rationality are several of the major defence investment projects
in which the projects are not set in a greater picture of military or social needs.
However, there is also a pronounced local focus in the E6 Northern beltway, the
Værnes control tower and the Regional University Hospital first building phase,
which creates various problems.
Assessments and Conclusions
Ex ante evaluation is needed to link the decision processes to the results of overriding
reasoning based on facts and systematic analysis. The result of a decision-making
process is not necessarily in accordance with this requirement, as has been shown.
The final choice can be better or worse than that recommended at the outset.
However, in any case, the best-case result comes from democratic processes that
legitimate the outcome. The criteria for ex ante evaluation are often associated with a
rational ideal of strong management and clear thinking.
Ex ante evaluations should also build on experience with ex post evaluations,
preferably in sufficient numbers to provide a greater scope of experience and, not
least, include several alternative courses of action. Moreover, the evaluation criteria
in ex ante evaluation correspond to a degree with those of ex post evaluation. This
is particularly important in constructing learning loops that function over time. Not
least, it is important that ex ante evaluation is made to a central reference in the
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subsequent decision-making process against which the various alternative courses of
action are evaluated.
The core of the method used here to evaluate and analyse 23 major investment
projects as decision-making processes is the employment of a set of logics as Blenses^.
This emphasizes various aspects of the processes.
& The instrumental logic emphasizes two central aspects: 1) the degree to which
decision-making processes associated with projects are characterized by political
and administrative control, and 2) rational calculation or clear organizational
reasoning. This perspective is the most relevant for explaining the decision-
making processes of the 23 projects. They are characterized by considerable
hierarchal control and influence but also by internal coalitions and compromises.
Conversely, there apparently is a clear potential for improvement, as implied by the
prevalent medium to low scorings in rational calculation. This clearly indicates a
potential for strengthening ex ante evaluation.
& The institutional logic focuses on how history and traditions bind, which provides
supplementary insights to those of instrumental logic. Particularly for military
projects, the historical path carries weight in winning coalitions, which in turn
contributes to decisions on problematic investments.
& Employing environmental logic, projects with alliances between the leaders of the
armed services and external actors in particular are typical.
& Contingency logic characterizes several projects, but the contingency is more often
steered than basic logic indicates. The evaluations of the front-end phases of 23
projects show that dissimilar logics are coupled in various ways in decision-making
processes. Even some of the logics point to problematic decisions, either due to lack
of goal attainment or excessive costs; there are examples showing that organization
and reflecting in other ways contributes to attaining goals and to legitimacy. Forms
of organization never have only positive or only negative effects, such that trade-
offs are necessary.
What can be learned from such an analysis? First, the decision-making process
associated with major public investment projects is complex, which implies that
learning should be complex and versatile. It is important to be aware of various
considerations and difficult trade-offs. Hence, our analysis functions as an ex post
evaluation. At the same time, the absence of clear organizational thought and
rational calculation, as a reflection upon the central aspects in the early phase of
a project’s life, affords considerable potential for ex ante evaluation. Second, ex
ante evaluation and its utilization is not an objective or unambiguous process, but
rather a political and administrative process. Various actors, such as political and
administrative leaders, may use these evaluations in differing ways. Some may
interpret them in their own interests and accordingly slant undertakings and
learning, whereas others may adhere more closely to conclusions and recommen-
dations suggested by the evaluators. In today’s modern societies, it is relatively
common that either evaluations are clearly managed, or that results are interpreted,
slanted, politicized and oversold. This analysis may contribute to more control and
greater breakthrough but also may undermine the credibility of and support of
projects.
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